

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 BONN 12882 01 OF 05 061341Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
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R 061324Z AUG 77
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
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AMEMBASSY PARIS
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BONN 12882

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PGOV UR GW US FR UK GE WB
SUBJECT: GENSCHER MEETING WITH SOVIET AMBASSADOR FALIN

REFS: (A) BONN 12830; (B) BONN 12813;
(C) BONN 10970; (D) BONN 10411

BEGIN SUMMARY. FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER INVITED SOVIET
AMBASSADOR FALIN IN FOR A TOUR D'HORIZON ON AUGUST 4,
SHORTLY AFTER THE RETURN OF THE LATTER TO BONN. THE
MEETING SERVED TO PICK UP THE THREAD OF THE FRG/SOVIET
DIALOGUE FROM GENSCHER'S VISIT TO MOSCOW IN JUNE AND
TO PROVIDE FALIN SOME GERMAN IMPRESSIONS CONCERNING
THE CHANCELLOR'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON IN JULY.
ACCORDING TO STATE SECRETARY VAN WELL, WHO BRIEFED
THE DCM ON THE CONVERSATION, GENSCHER STRESSED
THE FACT THAT THERE IS NO SUBSTANTIVE DIFFERENCE
BETWEEN THE FRG AND THE US ON HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BONN 12882 01 OF 05 061341Z

AND REASSURED FALIN WITH REGARD TO US ATTITUDES
TOWARDS ARMS CONTROL AND DETENTE. FALIN CLAIMED
THAT THE USSR WAS PUZZLED BY CURRENT AMERICAN POLICY
AND THOUGHT THAT THE US WAS SEEKING TO GO BACK
ON PRIOR COMMITMENTS.

FALIN SAID THAT BREZHNEV'S VISIT TO BONN WOULD NOT

TAKE PLACE BEFORE THE NOVEMBER 7 CELEBRATIONS AND THAT THE PRECISE TIMING WOULD DEPEND ON THE OUTCOME OF FURTHER BILATERAL TALKS WHICH POLITICAL DIRECTOR BLECH WILL CONDUCT IN MOSCOW IN MID-SEPTEMBER. FALIN ALSO DOWNPLAYED THE LIKELIHOOD OF A BREZHNEV VISIT TO THE US BUT DID NOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF A BRIEF WORKING SESSION WITH THE PRESIDENT SOMEWHERE ELSE.

BERLIN ISSUES FIGURED HEAVILY IN THE CONVERSATION, WITH FALIN ASSERTING THAT AN EXAGGERATION OF THE TIES BETWEEN THE FRG AND BERLIN WOULD CAUSE THE ENTIRE QA TO SHAKE. THE LORENZ TRIAL AND THE BAUM STATEMENT ON BERLIN AS A LAND OF THE FRG HAD BEEN DISCUSSED AT HIGH LEVELS IN MOSCOW. AS FOR THE ALLIED PATROLS IN EAST BERLIN, FALIN SAID THE SOVIET DEMAND HAD BEEN AIMED AT IMPROVING THE SITUATION IN BERLIN AND THAT THE WEST HAD EXAGGERATED ITS IMPORTANCE.

FALIN ECHOED BREZHNEV'S EARLIER STATEMENT TO GENSCHER THAT THERE WAS NO POSSIBILITY OF IMPROVING ON THE QA. HE ALSO STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF FRG/SOVIET COOPERATION IN PRACTICAL MATTERS, LEAVING ASIDE DIFFICULTIES OF LEGAL POSITION. ONE THEME THAT EMERGES FROM FALIN'S PRESENTATION --ASIDE FROM HIS RENEWED ASSERTIONS OF A SOVIET VOICE IN DECISIONS AFFECTING

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 BONN 12882 01 OF 05 061341Z

WEST BERLIN -- IS HIS ENCOURAGEMENT OF SOVIET-GERMAN BILATERALISM. IN THE CONTEXT OF HIS CRITICISMS OF THE US ADMINISTRATION, FALIN SEEMED TO BE SAYING THAT, IF US POLICY DIRECTIONS WERE UNCERTAIN, THE RUSSIANS AND GERMANS KNEW WHAT THEY WERE DOING AND SHOULD PURSUE COMMON INTERESTS. END SUMMARY.

1. FOREIGN OFFICE STATE SECRETARY VAN WELL BRIEFED THE DCM ON AUGUST 5 REGARDING A MEETING BETWEEN SOVIET AMBASSADOR FALIN (WHO HAD JUST RETURNED TO BONN) AND FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER WHICH TOOK PLACE ON AUGUST 4. THE MEETING WAS HELD AT THE REQUEST OF GENSCHER AND WAS DESIGNED TO PICK UP THE THREADS AFTER GENSCHER'S RECENT VISIT TO MOSCOW (REF C AND D).

2. GENSCHER INFORMED FALIN OF THE RESULTS OF HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON AND, ESPECIALLY WITH RESPECT TO HUMAN RIGHTS, TOLD HIM THAT THERE WAS COMPLETE UNITY BETWEEN THE US AND FRG VIEWS. HE ALSO DESCRIBED HOW HE HAD MET WITH THE FASCELL COMMITTEE AND HAD EXPLAINED CURRENT FRG POLICY, WITH WHICH FASCELL HAD AGREED. GENSCHER TOLD FALIN

THAT THE US APPRECIATES THAT DETENTE MUST GO FORWARD

CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 01 BONN 12882 02 OF 05 061345Z
ACTION SS-25

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 05 BONN 12882

EXDIS

AND THAT HELSINKI IS NOT THE END OF THE ROAD. HE
EXPRESSED HIS VIEW THAT IT IS IMPORTANT FOR OPINION-
MAKING CIRCLES IN THE US TO BE WELL-INFORMED ABOUT
THE USSR AND SAID THAT IT WAS A MISTAKE FOR THE
SOVIETS TO DENY THE FASCELL COMMITTEE VISAS.

3. WITH REGARD TO HUMAN RIGHTS, FALIN SAID HE HAD
THE IMPRESSION THAT THERE WERE DIFFERENCES OF
OPINION, AT LEAST IN NUANCES, BETWEEN WESTERN EUROPE
AND THE US. GENSCHER REPLIED THAT IT WAS NECESSARY
TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND
OPERATIVE ASPECTS. REGARDING THE FORMER, GENSCHER
STRESSED THE CONTINUITY OF US POLICY ON HUMAN RIGHTS
AND DETENTE. HE SAID THAT IT IS ONLY NATURAL THAT
PRESIDENT CARTER HAS HIS OWN CHARACTERISTIC AP-
PROACH. GENSCHER SAID THE US PUBLIC IS AGAIN UNITED
AFTER HAVING EXPERIENCED A DIFFICULT INTERNAL POLI-
TICAL SITUATION IN RECENT YEARS, THAT CONGRESS AND
THE POPULATION AT LARGE SUPPORT CARTER AND THAT THIS
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BONN 12882 02 OF 05 061345Z

FACT IS IMPORTANT TO WESTERN EUROPE. HE SAID IT WOULD BE MEANINGLESS TO THE RUSSIANS ALSO IF CARTER HAD INTERESTING IDEAS BUT NO POPULAR SUPPORT.

4. FALIN REPLIED THAT THE DIFFICULTY THE SOVIETS FACE IS THAT THEY DO NOT KNOW THE TRUE INTENTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES. HE RECALLED THE STATEMENTS MADE BY BREZHNEV DURING THE GENSCHER VISIT THAT US POLICY WAS SHOWING AGGRESSIVE SIGNS. HE SAID THE SOVIETS WANT COOPERATION AND A COMMON EFFORT TO SOLVE THE WORLD'S PROBLEMS AND THAT THERE IS NO CHANGE IN SOVIET POLICY. WHAT IRRITATES THE SOVIETS, HE SAID, IS THAT THERE APPEAR TO BE CHANGES IN US POLICY. HE SAID THAT THE SOVIETS WONDER WHETHER THE AMERICANS WISH TO UNDO DETENTE. WHILE THE US CAN BE ASSURED THERE WILL BE NO CHANGE IN SOVIET POLICY, IT IS NECESSARY TO KNOW WHAT THE NEW AMERICAN POLICY IS. IT IS EVEN POSSIBLE THAT THIS POLICY MIGHT BE BETTER, BUT IT IS NECESSARY TO FIND OUT AND BE SURE. HE SAID THE SOVIETS WISHED TO AVOID STUMBLING INTO THE BLIND ALLEY OF COLD WAR.

5. GENSCHER AGAIN REASSURED FALIN THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO CHANGE IN THE SUBSTANCE OF US POLICY AND THAT THIS HAS BEEN PROVEN, AMONG OTHER THINGS, BY THE BELGRADE CSCE PREPARATORY MEETING. FALIN SAID THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR HIM TO HEAR THIS FROM GENSCHER SINCE EVERY POLICY IS ONE OF NUANCE. WHILE INTENTIONS MAY BE GOOD, THE METHODS EMPLOYED MAY UNDO THESE GOOD INTENTIONS. HE EMPHASIZED AGAIN THAT WHAT IS NECESSARY IS A CONSISTENT POLICY AND THAT IN THE CASE OF THE SALT AND CSCE THE US HAS INTRODUCED CHANGES. IN WEST BERLIN THERE HAS BEEN A

CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 03 BONN 12882 02 OF 05 061345Z

HARDER US POLICY, FOR EXAMPLE, IN RESPONSE TO SOVIET PROTESTS ON THE LORENZ KIDNAPPING CASE. CONDUCTING THE TRIAL IN BERLIN IS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE QA AND CONSTITUTES GOVERNING WEST BERLIN BY THE FRG. SPEAKING OF ARMS CONTROL HE SAID THAT BOTH SIDES ARE ABLE TO IMPROVE THEIR CAPABILITY AND THAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT EVEN BE ABLE TO DO THIS AS WELL AS OR BETTER THAN THE US. GENSCHER REPLIED BY SAYING THAT HE WAS SURPRISED AT THE SOVIET REACTION IN THE LORENZ CASE. HE STRESSED THE CONTINUITY OF US POLICY ON BERLIN AND DISARMAMENT. THERE HAS BEEN NO HARDEN-

ING IN THE US POSITION OF DISARMAMENT; HE NOTED CARTER'S DECISION ON THE B-1 BOMBER. HE SAID THE SOVIETS HAD ALSO CAUSED UNREST IN BERLIN, FOR EXAMPLE, BY THEIR DEMAND THAT THE WESTERN POWERS END THEIR PATROLS IN EAST BERLIN.

6. FALIN REPLIED THAT THE SOVIET DEMANDS WERE INTENDED TO IMPROVE THE SITUATION IN BERLIN AND NOTED THAT THE PATROLS DID NOT REST ON ANY WRITTEN AGREEMENTS BUT WERE A PRACTICE BASED ON USAGE. THE WESTERN POWERS WERE REALLY ASKED TO TERMINATE THE PRACTICE GRADUALLY AND THERE WAS NO REQUIREMENT FOR THEM TO GIVE UP THEIR LEGAL POSITION. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE WESTERN PATROLS COULD CHANGE THEIR CONDUCT, FOR EXAMPLE, BY NO LONGER TAKING PHOTOGRAPHS IN EAST BERLIN AND BY CONDUCTING THEMSELVES MORE PROPERLY. FALIN REMINDED GENSCHER THAT THE SOVIETS COULD OF COURSE ALSO RESPOND IN KIND. HE SAID THAT THE WESTERN POWERS HAD EXAGGERATED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SOVIET REQUEST. FALIN ALSO NOTED THAT THERE IS ADDITIONAL HISTORY REGARDING THIS MATTER AND, IN WHAT GENSCHER

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 BONN 12882 03 OF 05 061352Z
ACTION SS-25

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 05 BONN 12882

EXDIS

INTERPRETED AS A REFERENCE TO AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN'S
DEMARCHE TO SECRETARY KISSINGER LAST SUMMER, FALIN

SAID THAT THE SOVIETS HAD NOT EXPECTED THE REQUEST TO BE IGNORED NOR TO BE MET WITH A "CRUDE NO."

7. WITH RESPECT TO THE LORENZ CASE, FALIN SAID HE HOPED THE FRG WOULD ALSO UNDERTAKE EFFORTS SUCH AS THOSE MENTIONED IN THE BREZHNEV/GENSCHER DISCUSSIONS TO IMPROVE THE SITUATION IN BERLIN (PRESUMABLY TO LESSEN TENSIONS THERE). FALIN SAID THAT THERE WAS NO POSSIBILITY OF IMPROVING ON THE QA AND IT WOULD BE BETTER TO AVOID PROBLEMS WITH IT BY ACCEPTING IT AS IT STANDS. HE SAID THIS WAS REPEATED IN THE BREZHNEV/GENSCHER DISCUSSIONS AND REITERATED THAT THE SOVIETS WANT A PEACEFUL SITUATION IN BERLIN. THE SOVIETS REALIZE THAT THE FRG HAS ITS OWN VIEWS ABOUT BERLIN, WHICH DIFFER EVEN FROM THOSE OF THE WESTERN POWERS, BUT THAT THE FRG VIEWS SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO STAND IN THE WAY OF COOPERATION WITH THE SOVIET
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BONN 12882 03 OF 05 061352Z

UNION.

8. FALIN RECALLED BREZHNEV'S TULA STATEMENT AND SAID THAT IT HAS APPARENTLY NOT BEEN SUFFICIENTLY APPRECIATED IN THE US. THE USSR WAS NOT SEEKING MILITARY SUPERIORITY. THE US SHOULD NOT ATTEMPT TO GAIN MILITARY SUPERIORITY OVER THE SOVIETS, SINCE THAT WOULD HAVE NEGATIVE RESULTS FOR THE ENTIRE WORLD. HE RECALLED THE RECENT DEMARCHE MADE BY SOVIET CHARGE TOKOVININ TO VAN WELL REGARDING THE BAUM STATEMENT ABOUT BERLIN (REFS A & B) AND SAID THAT THE SOVIETS CONSIDER BAUM'S STATEMENT TO BE SO SERIOUS THAT IT HAD BEEN DISCUSSED AT A VERY HIGH LEVEL ON THE RUSSIAN SIDE. IF THIS IS THE OFFICIAL FRG POSITION, HE SAID, IT CANNOT BE WITHOUT NEGATIVE RESULTS SINCE THE FACT THAT BERLIN IS NOT A PART OF THE FRG AND NOT TO BE GOVERNED BY IT IS A KEY PART OF THE QA. HE SAID THAT IF THE FRG EXAGGERATES THE TIES BETWEEN THE FRG AND BERLIN IT WILL CAUSE THE ENTIRE QA TO SHAKE AND THE SOVIETS HAVE NO DESIRE TO ENGAGE IN A FENCING MATCH WITH THE FRG.

9. GENSCHER SAID THAT THE GERMANS ALSO WANT TO MAINTAIN THE QA, REFERRED TO THE ALLIED SUSPENSION OF THOSE PORTIONS OF THE FRG BASIC LAW REGARDING BERLIN AND SAID THAT THERE IS NO GERMAN DESIRE TO REOPEN THE QUESTION OF THE SUSPENSION.

10. FALIN SAID THAT THIS WAS NOT WELL UNDERSTOOD BY THE SOVIETS. HE CONTINUED THAT IT IS IMPORTANT TO OBSERVE THE EXACT RULES OF THE GAME AND SAID THAT THE

QA ONLY PROVIDES FOR FOUR-POWER DECISIONS, NOT
THREE-POWER DECISIONS. HE NOTED THE WESTERN ATTEMPTS
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 BONN 12882 03 OF 05 061352Z

TO ARGUE THAT EAST BERLIN IS ALSO GOVERNED BY THE
QA, WHICH HE CONTENDED IT WAS NOT, AND SAID THAT
FOLLOWING THE NEGOTIATIONS OF THE QA NEITHER THE GDR
NOR THE USSR HAVE MADE STATEMENTS WHICH ARE INTENDED
TO DISTURB THE SITUATION IN BERLIN.

11. GENSCHER SAID THAT PRACTICES WERE MORE
IMPORTANT THAN ARGUMENTS ABOUT LEGAL POSITIONS
AND ALSO EXPLAINED THAT BAUM'S STATEMENT REGARDING
"LAND BERLIN" WAS IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION IN THE
BUNDESTAG.

12. FALIN AND GENSCHER BRIEFLY DISCUSSED THE FACT
THAT FOREIGN OFFICE POLITICAL DIRECTOR BLECH PLANS TO
TRAVEL TO MOSCOW IN MID-SEPTEMBER. FALIN SAID THAT
BREZHNEV STILL INTENDS TO COME TO THE FRG THIS YEAR
BUT AT THE MOMENT NO DATE HAS BEEN FIXED. HE SAID
THAT THE VISIT WOULD HARDLY TAKE PLACE BEFORE THE
60TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION AND THAT
THE PRECISE TIMING WOULD DEPEND ON THE CONTENT OF THE
PLANNED FRG/USSR TALKS. HE ALSO SAID IT IS UNLIKELY
THAT BREZHNEV WILL VISIT THE US BUT A WORKING SESSION
WITH PRESIDENT CARTER, PERHAPS FOR A FEW HOURS,
OUTSIDE THE US, IS POSSIBLE. HE EXPRESSED THE
SOVIET VIEW THAT SUCH MEETINGS SHOULD NOT EXACERBATE
DIFFERENCES. GENSCHER RESPONDED THAT THE FRG
BELIEVED A CARTER/BREZHNEV MEETING WOULD BE A GOOD
THING.

13. FALIN SPOKE OF CARTER'S CHARLESTON SPEECH AND

CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 01 BONN 12882 04 OF 05 061359Z
ACTION SS-25

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 05 BONN 12882

EXDIS

SAID THAT IT IS IMPORTANT TO THE SOVIETS THAT THEY MAINTAIN GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE FRG. WITH RESPECT TO BERLIN, THE USSR AND THE FRG SHOULD NOT ALLOW THEIR LEGAL DIFFERENCES TO RESULT IN WORDS OR CONDUCT WHICH DRIVE THE TWO SIDES FURTHER APART. HE SAID IT IS NOT EASY FOR THE SOVIETS TO CHANGE THEIR POLICY ON BERLIN, AT LEAST NOT TODAY OR TOMORROW. HOWEVER, THERE MAY BE A POSSIBILITY OF IMPROVEMENT IN THE SITUATION IN THE FUTURE. HE SAID THE SOVIETS UNDERSTAND BERLIN IS VITAL TO THE FRG BUT THAT, FOR THE SOVIETS, IT IS A QUESTION OF RELATIONS WITH THE THREE ALLIES, BROADER WORLDWIDE INTERESTS, AND THE CONDUCT OF THE UNITED STATES.

14. GENSCHER SAID THAT THE FRG IS ESPECIALLY INTERESTED IN A CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE US AND THE USSR AND THEREFORE WELCOMES THE CARTER PROPOSAL FOR A MEETING WITH BREZHNEV. HE EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT THE GENERAL RUSSIAN ESTIMATE OF

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BONN 12882 04 OF 05 061359Z

CURRENT US/USSR RELATIONS CONTAINED TOO NEGATIVE AN EMPHASIS AND SAID THAT THE US DOES NOT WISH TO AGGRAVATE BUT RATHER TO IMPROVE ITS RELATIONS WITH THE USSR.

15. THE DCM THANKED VAN WELL FOR HIS REPORT AND ASKED FOR HIS VIEWS ON THE OVERALL THRUST AND PURPOSE OF FALIN'S PRESENTATION. VAN WELL REPLIED THAT, FROM THE SOVIET POINT OF VIEW, POLICY SHOULD BE CONDUCTED AS IT HAD BEEN DEVELOPED IN VARIOUS AGREEMENTS. HE SAID THAT THE SOVIETS WERE PROBABLY PUZZLED ABOUT THE TRUE INTENTIONS OF THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION AND WERE SENSITIVE REGARDING AMERICAN TALK OF A BREZHNEV/CARTER MEETING. FALIN SHOWED FEELINGS OF RESERVE

AND SENSITIVITY AND WAS TOUCHY ON THE QUESTION OF ARMAMENTS, ESPECIALLY THE SUGGESTION THAT THE WEST WAS GAINING SUPERIORITY OVER THE SOVIETS. FALIN'S COMMENTS CONTAINED A STRONG PLEA FOR BALANCE. THE SOVIETS DO NOT WANT TO CHANGE THEIR POSITION ON BERLIN, THEY SEEK TO AVOID DISCUSSION OF BASIC QUESTIONS AND SUGGEST RATHER THAT PRACTICAL MATTERS SHOULD BE DISCUSSED. THE SOVIETS CONTINUE TO STATE THAT THEY WOULD LIKE TO DEVELOP RELATIONS WITH THE FRG BUT TRY TO IMPRESS ON THE FRG THE LIMITS IN BERLIN. AT PRESENT, THE SOVIETS ARE OBVIOUSLY THINKING ABOUT VARIOUS POSSIBILITIES (NOT EXCLUDING THE SIGNATURE OF SEVERAL FRG/USSR AGREEMENTS THUS FAR BLOCKED BY THE FRG'S INSISTENCE ON INCLUSION OF BERLIN) AND BLECH WILL EXPLORE THIS QUESTION FURTHER DURING HIS TRIP TO THE USSR IN SEPTEMBER.

16. THE DCM SAID HE THOUGHT THE SOVIETS HAD BY NOW HAD A NUMBER OF RELIABLE, AUTHORITATIVE INDICATIONS OF CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 BONN 12882 04 OF 05 061359Z

US INTENTIONS. FALIN'S APPROACH WAS DISENGENUOUS. HE SEEMED TO BE DELIBERATELY EXAGGERATING FOR GERMAN BENEFIT THE EXTENT OF SOVIET CONCERN OVER US POLICY. WITH RESPECT TO THE LORENZ AND BAUM DEMARCHES AND BERLIN GENERALLY, THE DCM ASKED VAN WELL HOW HE ESTIMATED THE "HEAT" ON THE SOVIET SIDE. HE ASKED WHETHER IT SEEMED IN THE NORMAL RANGE OF SOVIET REACTIONS OR NOT.

17. VAN WELL SAID THAT THE SOVIETS KEEP ALL OF THEIR OPTIONS OPEN. THE FRG HAS THE IMPRESSION THAT THE SOVIETS' GENERAL STRATEGY IS TO PUSH FORWARD AGGRESSIVELY IN ORDER TO REDUCE FRG LEGAL POSITIONS ON BERLIN. THIS HAS BEEN CONFIRMED BY SEVERAL DIFFERENT INDICATIONS. HE SAID THAT SOVIET MFA DEPARTMENT THREE DEPUTY CHIEF KVITSINSKIY (WHO PARTICIPATED IN NEGOTIATING THE QA) HAD TOLD A GERMAN EMBASSY OFFICIAL IN MOSCOW, AT THE TIME OF GENSCHER'S VISIT THERE, THAT THE FRG CAN NO LONGER OBTAIN SOVIET AND GDR CONCESSIONS IN EXCHANGE FOR MONEY. IT MUST NOW PAY BY GIVING UP ITS UNTENABLE LEGAL POSITIONS SUCH AS THOSE REGARDING "LAND BERLIN," BORDERS AND THE NATIONALITY QUESTION. VAN WELL SAYS THIS CONFORMS TO THE SOVIET LINE BOTH IN THE LORENZ CASE AND REGARDING THE BAUM STATEMENT. HE SAID THAT WITH REGARD TO THESE, THE SOVIETS BELIEVE THEY SEE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE FRG AND THE ALLIES AND SEEK TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THESE DIFFERENCES. THE TYPICAL SOVIET LINE IS TO GIVE THE FRG A BAD CONSCIENCE BY PORTRAYING IT AS THE

ACCUSED AND CONTENDING THAT IT IS VIOLATING EXISTING AGREEMENTS. THIS IS ACCOMPANIED BY A PARALLEL CONCILIATORY LINE IN WHICH THE SOVIETS SAY THAT THEY ARE

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PAGE 01 BONN 12882 05 OF 05 061347Z
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AMEMBASSY PARIS
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 05 OF 05 BONN 12882

EXDIS

NOT TRYING TO IMPAIR THE GENERAL STATE OF RELATIONS WITH THE FRG AND THIS TACTIC WAS REFLECTED IN THE FALIN CONVERSATION. VAN WELL EMPHASIZED THAT THE ATMOSPHERE OF THE GENSCHER/FALIN DISCUSSION WAS QUITE FRIENDLY.

18. COMMENT: WHILE THE FALIN/GENSCHER MEETING CONTAINS NOTHING PARTICULARLY NOVEL, IT IS INTERESTING THAT FALIN SOUGHT TO CONVEY TO THE FRG (PRESUMABLY FOR TRANSMISSION TO THE US) THE SOVIET VIEWS ON BILATERAL US/USSR RELATIONS. VAN WELL'S COMMENT THAT THE MEETING WAS VERY FRIENDLY CONTRASTS WITH THE APPEARANCE WHICH COULD BE DERIVED FROM RECENT SOVIET PROTESTS ON FRG ACTIVITIES AND STATEMENTS IN CONNECTION WITH BERLIN. THROUGHOUT THE CONVERSATION, THE RECURRENT SOVIET THEME APPEARS THAT FRG/USSR RELATIONS SHOULD DEVELOP REGARDLESS OF DIFFERENCES OF VIEW ABOUT BERLIN OR UNCERTAINTY IN US POLICY DIRECTIONS. THUS, FALIN'S PERFORMANCE IS IN THE PATTERN OF
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PAGE 02 BONN 12882 05 OF 05 061347Z

ENCOURAGING THE GERMANS TO PURSUE MATTERS OF COMMON
BILATERAL INTEREST IN THEIR RELATIONS WITH MOSCOW.

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